Threat model
What CooL defends against, what it does not, and who you still have to trust.
The useful question about an evidence system is not what it proves but who it still requires you to trust.
Removed from the trust set
CooL, for record contents. You recompute every digest and signature yourself with a published verifier. We cannot alter a record you already hold.
CooL, for signing keys. Keys are derived inside the enclave from the measurement. There is no escrow — we have no copy to surrender, and no code path that would produce one.
The network. Verification makes zero network calls, and on the website that count is measured rather than claimed.
Still in the trust set
CooL, for log history. A transparency log signed only by its operator is tamper-evident against outsiders and not against the operator. Against a determined insider at CooL, the log alone is not sufficient. An attested witness now runs in its own Phala CVM with a separate enclave-sealed key, but under the same account — a witness operated by another organisation closes this fully.
The hardware vendor. A TEE attestation roots in Intel's signing key. If you do not trust the vendor, attestation proves nothing to you. No design removes this.
Your own operators. CooL records what your people did. It does not prevent them doing it, and was never intended to.
Attacks and outcomes
| Attack | Outcome |
|---|---|
| Edit a record after sealing | binding and signature both fail |
| Re-sign with a different key | signature fails against the pinned key |
| Staple a quote from another image onto a record | enclave fails — the quote's report_data commits to a different signing key |
| Redeploy from a patched image | A different key is derived inside the enclave; the old pin no longer verifies |
| Drop a record from the log | inclusion fails for that record |
| Rewrite log history | cool log --consistency <n> fails between the old and new tree heads |
| Insider at CooL rewrites the whole log, including history before any witness co-signed | Not detected today. Needs an organisationally independent witness. |
| Backdate a tree head by signing it later and claiming an earlier time | Not detected without a Bitcoin anchor. A signature alone never proves when — see anchoring. |
See the verifier reference for what each of the
seven domains — binding, signature, inclusion, witnesses,
attestation, enclave, anchor — actually recomputes.
Failure model
Capture is asynchronous, out-of-band and fail-open. If CooL is unreachable your inference continues; events queue, and what cannot be queued is counted with the count itself written as a signed entry. Loss is recorded, never silent.
RA-TLS is the opposite direction: fail-closed toward the network. A measurement mismatch means the channel never opens and nothing is transmitted.
Next
- Limits — which of the gaps above are actively being closed, and in which gate
- Witness guide — the mechanism that closes the "insider rewrites the log" gap
- Verifier reference — the seven checks this page's attacks map onto