Security model
Seven verification domains, checked independently and reported separately. All seven have been verified on real Intel TDX hardware on Phala Cloud — and the limits of that evidence are named here rather than averaged into a single green tick.
The seven domains
A verifier that returns one boolean forces you to trust its weighting. This one reports each property separately, so you can decide which ones you actually need.
canonicalThe record serialises deterministically.
Re-encodes the core as CDE CBOR and compares bytes. Two implementations must agree exactly, or the digest below means nothing.
bindingThe digest matches the record.
SHA-256 over the canonical bytes. Alter one byte of the record and this fails.
signatureThe record was signed by the pinned key.
ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) and Ed25519, both required. A forger needs to break both, and one of them is post-quantum.
inclusionThe record is in the log at the position claimed.
RFC 6962 audit path recomputed to the signed tree head.
consistencyThe log only ever grew.
Consistency proof between two tree heads. Catches a log that dropped or rewrote history between observations.
attestationWhere the record was produced.
A raw Intel TDX quote from a Phala Cloud CVM, via dstack. MRTD and RTMR0–3 are pinned, and report_data binds the CooL signing key. Records sealed without hardware still report simulated and can never report pass.
witnessesAn independent party saw the same log.
A witness in its own Phala CVM, on a different node, with its own enclave-sealed key, verifies the log before co-signing and refuses forks and rollbacks. Both CVMs ran under one account, so independent operation is not claimed.
Full disclosure
The hardware runs are real. These are the edges of what they show, and the rules are enforced in the verifier rather than stated in copy.
Receipts sealed inside Phala Cloud CVMs carry a raw TDX quote that Phala's attestation service verified, and that a local dcap-qvl check accepted from archived collateral. No GPU attestation is claimed, and CooL does not judge TCB quality or quote freshness itself. Read the evidence.
Records this site seals in your browser are not hardware-backed. Run the verifier with --require-hardware against one and it refuses. The production path fails closed rather than downgrading to simulation.
The witness runs in its own CVM on a different node, with its own enclave-sealed key, and refuses forged heads and replaced logs. What it shows is separation of key custody and process.
Both CVMs were deployed from the same account, so a witness operated by a different organisation is not demonstrated. A CooL self-signature is shown but never counted as a witness — that rule is in the verifier.
Check it in thirty seconds
npm install -g cool-nwc
# seal something, then demand a hardware root
cool verify ./change-receipt.json --require-hardware
REFUSED attestation: simulated
policy: requireHardware is set and this receipt is
not backed by a verified hardware quoteTrust boundaries
Control plane is ours; data plane is yours. The split is architectural — there is no configuration flag that turns it off, because there is no code path that would honour one.
Keys are derived inside the enclave from the measurement. There is no key escrow, which is why we cannot forge your records even under legal compulsion.
If CooL is unreachable your inference continues. Capture queues; what it cannot queue is counted and the count is itself signed.
RA-TLS attests before it sends. A measurement mismatch means the channel never opens and nothing is transmitted.
Disclosure
Tell us before you tell anyone else, and we will credit you. We do not run a paid bounty yet and we are not going to pretend otherwise.