Verify it yourself
Reproduce a CooL record and check it without trusting CooL, the network, or this website.
The claim this product makes is that you do not have to trust us. This page is how you test that claim rather than accept it.
Get a receipt we did not hand you directly
Open /verify and let the page seal a record in your browser, then download it. The cryptography runs on your machine — the receipt is produced locally, not fetched.
Check it on a machine with no network
npm install -g cool-nwc
# disconnect, then:
cool verify ./change-receipt.jsonThe verifier makes no network calls. On the website that claim is measured
rather than asserted: for the duration of a verify run the page replaces
fetch, XMLHttpRequest.open, WebSocket, EventSource and sendBeacon with
counting wrappers and then prints the counter. The zero you see is a
measurement.
Now make it fail
A verifier that only ever says yes has told you nothing. Try each of these.
# 1. Edit one byte of the record body, then:
cool verify ./tampered.json
# binding and signature both fail
# 2. Demand a hardware root of a receipt sealed on your laptop:
cool verify ./change-receipt.json --require-hardware
# REFUSED: attestation is simulated
# (a receipt sealed on Phala Cloud Intel TDX passes this check)The second one is the important one. --require-hardware is a real option, and
a receipt without a vendor-rooted quote is rejected outright however many other
domains pass.
Check the implementation against the spec
The browser build of the SDK differs from upstream in exactly one file —
codec.ts, whose hex and base64 helpers were rewritten off Node's Buffer onto
btoa/atob. That deviation is proven byte-transparent rather than asserted:
npm run verify:sdkIt mints a receipt, tampers with it, confirms rejection on both domains, then
verifies the published cool-spec conformance vectors — produced by the
upstream Node implementation — under the browser-safe code, and confirms every
tampered vector is rejected.
Reproduce the whole chain from source
The deeper version of "verify it yourself" is not trusting the published package either. The SDK is Apache-2.0 at github.com/Northwind-Cipher/cool-sdk: clone it, build it yourself, and seal a record with your own build rather than the one on npm.
git clone https://github.com/Northwind-Cipher/cool-sdk.git
cd cool-sdk && npm install && npm run build
node ./dist/cli/index.js seal prompt local#test "reproduced locally"If that receipt verifies against the same conformance vectors as the published package, the published package is not doing anything your own build cannot do — which is the actual claim "offline-verifiable" is making.
Next
- Receipt spec — what you just verified, field by field
- Verifier reference — what each of the seven domains actually checks
- Threat model — who you still have to trust, even after this